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l. Beginning Explorations
It is no secret that theology is no longer considered a necessary
subject in the modern university. I am getting old, but I have given
myself the task before I die to understand better why this is the case
and what, if anything, might be said that could help those that assume
that theology is not to be part of modern university curricula to think
again. Yet I have to admit that I am unsure how to pursue this subject,
beset as it is by historical, political, and intellectual developments not
easily separated. So the subtitle of this paper, “Beginning
Explorations,” not only is an attempt to be truthful about the status of
the claims I make in this paper, but also is a call for help. I would and
will welcome those who can help me ask the right questions or even
know where to begin thinking about where to begin.
I have begun to explore these questions in several papers over the
past few years. For example, I have written a paper on Luigi
Giussani’s book, The Risk of Education, in which I try to draw out the
implications for the university of Giussani’s claim that:
The Christian fact is permanent throughout history. It has a structure
that nothing can change because it is a definitive event. Nevertheless,
the Christian who lives out this event, in dealing with the cultural,
social, and political conditions of his times – unless he lacks
intelligence or is slothful – cannot help but judge the prevailing ideas
and structures from the point of view of his lived faith. As a result,
the desire to create an alternative culture and alternative structures is
unavoidable.1
If Giussani is right, and I certainly think he is, I argue that
Christianity may well produce knowledges that are different than
those represented in the modern university. In a sermon entitled “On
Milk and Jesus,” celebrating the installation of Dr. Gerald Gerbrandt
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as the first President of the Canadian Mennonite University, I even
suggest that if Christian universities are faithful to the material
practices that make Christians Christian, it is not unreasonable to
think that the way knowledges are shaped in Christian universities –
knowledges such as physics and agriculture – may appear quite
differently than in other universities.2
I have also argued in a paper entitled, “Pro Ecclesia, Pro Texana:
Schooling the Heart in the Heart of Texas,” that the current
enthusiasm to think what makes a university Christian is a concern
for the teaching of “ethics” is a mistake. The “ethics” that is
inevitably taught in the name of making the university morally
responsible, I argue, cannot help but underwrite the students’
presumption that when everything is said and done they have to make
up their own minds. Moreover, to concentrate on “ethics” as the
identifying mark of Christian education fails to note that the most
important ethical formation of students in universities occurs in
courses that allegedly have nothing to do with ethics. In each of these
papers I argue that at least one of the problems facing any serious
attempt at Christian higher education is an unwillingness to explore
the tensions between what universities should be and the necessity to
produce students who are good citizens in social orders that are
allegedly democratic.
These papers do no more than set the stage for the issue I will try
to address in this paper, namely, why it is assumed that theology is
not a proper subject in the modern university. Why is it assumed that
the kind of knowledge theology represents is in some fashion
deficient when compared to other academic subjects? Of course,
some may object that theology can be taught in the modern university
as long as you assume theology names no more than a report on what
was once believed or still believed by Christians. Such a view,
however, makes the issue far too easy. Theology proper may involve
such reports, but theology as a discipline is a constructive and
normative mode of reflection on how and what Christians believe
about the way things are in the light of our conviction that the way
things are has been created by God.3
It is my conviction that until we can make some headway on
these issues, all the talk about how the Christian university might be
different than other universities is just that: it is just talk or, put more
negatively, such talk is ideological. Yet given the complex reality of
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the contemporary university, Christian or non-Christian, it is not easy
to know how the question or questions involving why or how
theological knowledge may or may not be a legitimate subject in the
university can be pursued. If, for example, most academics think
there is no problem for departments of economics and schools of
business to presume the normative status of the capitalist order, that
is, capitalism can be advocated between consenting adults, why is
there such a problem with theology? I assume the answers to the
question why theology is excluded from the university differ from
one institution to another. But in order to make the question concrete,
I think a speech by the President of Yale, Richard Levin, nicely
exemplifies some of the major reasons theology is thought to be at
best not necessary for educating students and at worst a subject that
cannot pass the epistemological standards necessary to be an
academic subject.
2. An Exhibit of the Problem
Soon after becoming President of Yale, Richard Levin addressed the
incoming class of 1993. Since this was the first address President
Levin made as President, much thought obviously went into what he
had to say. The address was entitled, “The Capacity for Independent
Thought” and was reprinted in the Yale University Magazine.
President Levin begins by noting it is important to make clear what
those newly entering Yale as well as their parents are “buying for all
that money.”4 According to Levin they are buying a liberal education
that is different from a professional education or vocational training.
Some, he notes, define liberal education in terms of a curriculum
associated with great works of literature, philosophy, and history.
Others, following Cardinal Newman, argue that liberal education is
an end in itself directed to no purpose other than the free exercise of
the mind. Levin observes, however, that these views need not be in
conflict and in fact a report by the Yale College faculty in 1827,
underwritten by the then President of Yale, Jeremiah Day, argued that
the development of qualities of mind and mastery of certain specific
content were inseparable. According to Levin, the faculty recognized
that the corpus of knowledge appropriate to liberal education was not
immutable. “As knowledge varies, education should vary with it.”5
Levin claims that as observers and forecasters of the
development of the liberal curriculum in America the authors of the
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1827 Yale report were quite accurate. The curriculum has changed
but the university is still committed to providing a liberal education.
In particular Levin observes, “We no longer consider rhetoric and
theology, for example, to be indispensable subjects.” Such subjects
cannot be at the heart of a liberal education according to Levin
because the essence of such an education is “to develop the freedom
to think critically and independently, to cultivate one’s mind to its
fullest potential, to liberate oneself from prejudice, superstition, and
dogma.”
Science and mathematics are, therefore, crucial for the development
of such a mind. In pure mathematics and theoretical physics, for
example, one learns how to reason deductively from clearly defined
premises. In the experimental sciences one learns the method of
induction, how to make proper inferences from evidence. Similarly,
the great works of Western Philosophy provide examples of how the
mind liberates itself from prejudice by the rigorous application of
reason to questions of how we know and how we act.
Levin argues what is read does matter, but less attention should
be paid to race, ethnicity, and gender of the authors read, and more to
how they confront what it means to be human.
Yet whatever the content of the curriculum might be, Levin
argues that it is not the role of the university to teach these freshmen
what to think but rather how to think. In order to drive this point
home, Levin quotes Thomas Jefferson’s advice to his nephew Peter
Carr in 1787: “Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal
every fact, every opinion …. Lay aside all prejudice on both sides,
and neither believe nor reject anything, because any other persons …
have rejected it or believed it. Your own reason is the only oracle
given you by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness,
but uprightness of the decision.” Levin comments that such an
endorsement of reason and independent critical thinking has not lost
its importance. “The university remains committed to these values of
the Enlightenment.”
Levin observes that the argument he has made against “useful”
knowledge allies him with Cardinal Newman, who rejected utilitarian
arguments for support of higher education. But Levin also notes that
Newman “with some irony” noted that an education aimed solely at
developing the capacity to reason can be defended on utilitarian
grounds because it produces good citizens. Such an education does so
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because a man so trained has a clear and conscious view of his own
opinions and judgments, “a truth in developing them, an eloquence in
expressing them, and a force in expressing them. It teaches him to see
things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of
thought, to detect what is sophistical, and discard what is irrelevant.
It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject
with facility.” 
According to Levin, liberal education is, therefore, a crucial
source for “the preservation of individual freedom and democracy.”
Democracies depend on citizens who have been liberally educated,
that is, who have the capacity for reason, reflection, and critical
judgment. Citizens so educated are the most reliable source of
resistance to forces of prejudice and intolerance that always threaten
to undermine free inquiry and free expression.
I have taken the time to present President Levin’s account of
liberal education not because I think it peculiarly perverse, but
because it so nicely articulates the general assumptions that are
assumed as a given in American education. Of course we may wonder
how anyone could become president of a major American institution
who assumes that Thomas Jefferson and Cardinal Newman can be in
agreement about anything. But perhaps President Levin should not be
held accountable. He is an economist. But surely his speech writer
should have known better. 
3. The Incoherence of the University
More troubling than the sources Levin uses to support his views,
however, is how President Levin’s speech belies the university he
administers. I am not suggesting President Levin is consciously
duplicitous in his advocacy of a liberal education. Rather I am
suggesting that quite understandably he is unable to give a coherent
account of the diverse reality that is the modern university which I
assume Yale represents. For Yale University, like almost any large
university in America, is constituted by utilitarian and research
endeavors that are not consistent with President Levin’s advocacy of
a liberal education. The freshmen, moreover, will discover in their
first week of classes that President Levin’s speech has little to do with
the reality of Yale.
In his extraordinary account of the crucial period from 1865 to
1910 of the American university, Laurence Veysey helps us
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understand how the universities we now inhabit came to be. Veysey
notes that the early justification of the universities – committed to
defend what Protestants understood as orthodoxy – as the place
where the mental and moral faculties of the students were disciplined
by rigorous study of ancient languages was soon defeated. The defeat
of this mode of education was not the result of a clear alternative
educational theory or practice, but rather was more a response to the
need for the university to justify itself to a quite different social order
than the one that gave birth to early Harvard and Yale.
According to Veysey, after the Civil War almost every significant
change in higher education lay “in the direction of concessions to the
utilitarian type of demand for reform.”6 Students were to be educated
for “real life,” which meant they were to be made citizens of a
democratic nation by being trained in the university with the skills
befitting their vocational ambitions. Veysey notes that the appeal to
democracy was as ubiquitous as it was vague,7 but such an appeal
served to justify the acceptance by universities of subjects that had
once been excluded. The founding of Cornell gave institutional form
to this kind of university, but the appeal to democracy was also
shaping developments at Harvard under President Eliot.8
The development of the “serviceable university” resulted in a
transformation of the curriculum by the beginning of a variety of new
departments of learning. Departments of education, domestic science,
business administration, sanitary science, physical education and
engineering became part of the accepted curriculum of the university.
David Starr Jordan, the president of Cornell, Indiana, and Stanford,
declared in 1899 that “it is not for the university to decide on the
relative values of knowledge. Each man makes his own market,
controlled by his own standards. It is for the university to see that all
standards are honest, that all work is genuine.”9
At the same time as utilitarian justifications were shaping the
university, the influence of German universities in their stress on
research was also having an effect on the American university.
Though often associated with the founding of Johns Hopkins
University, Veysey argues, the ideal of the “pure scientist” became
widespread throughout American institutions. The emphasis on
science for science’s sake in an interesting way resulted in an
increasing specialization of knowledge shared with the movement
toward practicality.10 In fact, however, the assumptions of the
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“intense seeker after new knowledge” took on the characteristics
once associated with religion. Veysey even suggests these determined
researchers were the new monks in service to an ideal of the
university that was increasingly seen as an alternative to the religious
past.11
Yet the influence of Germany was to be balanced by the
continuing appeal of Oxford and Cambridge. So for many the
university was still considered the crucial institution for the
liberalizing of culture through the training of gentlemen.12 It was
assumed that the training of the cultured personality was to be done
primarily through what we now call the humanities.13 The
commitment to the humanities in the name of educating the “well
rounded individual” was often associated with colleges, but was also
very influential at Yale and Princeton. However, this commitment to
scholarship as a formation of an elite (which meant it was sometimes
seen to be in tension with democracy) could be found in figures such
as the Harvard Philosopher, George Santayana. Santayana put the
matter this way: “There are always a few men whose main interest is
to note the aspects of things in an artistic or philosophical way. They
are rather useless individuals, but as I happen to belong to the class,
I think them much superior to the rest of mankind.”14
For anyone associated with the university it is not hard to see the
continuing influence of these developments Veysey locates in the
antebellum university in America. Yet as helpful as Veysey’s
description of these various emphases may be, I think even more
important is his attention to the development of the
institutionalization of the university from 1890 to 1910. By 1890 the
university was assumed to be part of the American landscape. In short
it had become a success.15 The success meant that however the
faculty may have understand the work of the university, the main
character of the university was determined by the emerging
bureaucratic structure. The university was now an institution
identified by “the administration”: characterized by a hierarchy
comprised of trustees, president, deans, department chairmen, and
finally the faculty.16 No matter what the faculty thought about
educational alternatives, the administrator was bound to be a
diplomat and politician if he was to serve the institution. Holders of
such offices thrive on compromise, wanting all sorts of diverse
people to go away pleased.17 Veysey observes:
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Here, then, was a major and controversial new force in American
academic life. In response to what conditions had it appeared? The
most important answer lies with the institution. Both intellectually
and in terms of structure, the American university was becoming too
diverse easily to define – or to control. The adherence of academic
leaders to varying educational philosophies, the emergence of
crystallized departments of learning, and the presence of larger
numbers of students all contributed to this result. Often an
undergraduate college basically English in conception was wedded,
by loose financial ties, to a Germanic graduate school. To European
eyes an American institution such as Harvard might seem “a chaos.”
No longer did any over-all intellectual formula exist to counter (or to
cloak) such fragmentation; neither the Christian religion in any of its
varieties, nor positive science, nor humane culture proved self-
evidently capable of making sense out of the entire range of
knowledge and opinion. As long as argument in these terms was
possible, the university could mean no one thing. Santayana
despairingly commented: “Each man knows the value of his work …
but he feels also the relativity of this work and of its value without
being able to survey the whole organism of human interests and
adjust himself confidently to the universal life.”18
I think that helps explain why President Levin’s address is such
an incoherent but interesting document. Levin at once privileges the
sciences to supply both inductive and deductive forms of rationality
in order to defend a liberal understanding of the purpose of the
university. He seems to disavow all utilitarian justifications other
than that training in the sciences and reading the great works of
Western philosophy will produce people capable of sustaining
democracy. As I suggested above, however, such an account fails to
do justice to the utilitarian justification of many of the disciplines,
including Levin’s discipline of economics, so characteristic of the
modern university and no doubt true of Yale. It is equally the case that
the sciences do not understand themselves to be “pure,” but rather
represent research agenda funded by the NSF and NIH and justified
by the promise of future developments.19
Perhaps even more troubling, Levin seems to have no
understanding of the problematic character of his understanding of
rationality. He seems to assume that the “prejudice, superstition, and
dogma” from which we are to be liberated by reason has been
decisively called into question by intellectual developments of the
university.20 From such a perspective his dismissal of theology, a
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dismissal no doubt he thinks justified by his assumptions about
rationality, is quite simply arbitrary.21 One suspects such dismissals
of theology have more to do with the politics of liberal social orders
than whether theology passes muster as a knowledge of the
university. The determination of liberal societies to keep religious
convictions private is one reason, if not the most important reason,
theology is not thought to be appropriate in university curricula. Such
curricula increasingly seem determined to avoid teaching any subject
that is considered “controversial” because such subjects do not
represent the kind of knowledge necessary to secure cooperation
between individuals in liberal societies.
If I am right to describe Levin’s address as a representative of the
“incoherence” of the American university, one might think such an
incoherence to be an opportunity for the reintroduction of theology as
a subject in the modern university,22 a subject that will probably be
seen as one of the “methods” characteristic of religious studies
departments. Of course, to have theology so located may not be an
advantage, as few departments in the modern university are as
controverted as “religious studies.”23 Indeed I think it is quite telling
that departments of history and religious studies often are the last
representatives of modernist presumptions about objectivity and
rationality.
John Milbank observes that the condition in which the modern
university finds itself can provide what he characterizes as a cynical
reason for theology in the university. That cynical reason is that:
utter incoherence and lack of ability to withstand the critical trial of
reason does not matter so long as one can come up with cash and
customers; in our postmodern era the “free, rational inquiry” of the
Enlightenment which could reveal only formal truths as objectively
real, thus handing over the whole realm of the substantive to the play
of agnostic forces, has itself been inevitably invaded by such forces,
since form feeds only on the substantive, and never perfectly inhabits
its own purity. Enlightenment, therefore, is bound to evolve into the
postmodern mixture of the purest, most unbounded and therefore
most rigorous logic, plus the most untrammelled sway of vanity and
fashion. In many ways a “religious studies department” is well
adapted to our era. But we should be warned: the point of fashion is
to change, and religious constituencies may well yet further wither
away, or more probably mutate and take their custom elsewhere, far
away from universities (or what in the future will remain of them).24
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4. Theology and the University: Can Newman Help?
I think Milbank is right to warn us against using the incoherence of the
modern university to secure a place for theology. I have some sympathy,
moreover, for his claim that at least one of the reasons that the university
finds itself in disarray is because it has abandoned the theological task
of studying that which is inimitably real. In his essay, “The Conflict of
the Faculties: Theology and the Economy of the Sciences,” with his
customary audacity Milbank argues, contra Kant, that theology is now
the only discipline capable of reclaiming the purpose of the university.25
It is so because truth for theology is the adequation of knowledge with
the real, but only God is the entirely real reality who is infinitely actual
and infinitely knowing.26 It is not, therefore, a question of the legitimacy
of theology in the university, but rather unless all the “other disciplines
are (at least implicitly) ordered to theology (assuming that this means
participation in God’s self-knowledge – as in the Augustinian tradition)
they are objectively and demonstrably null and void, altogether lacking
in truth, which to have any meaning must involve some sort of
adequation (for mere ‘coherence’ can only concern the coherence of
convention or appearances).”27
I confess I am tempted to side with Milbank if for no other reason
than that his position is so offensive. Moreover, that such a position
does not have a “snowball’s chance in hell” of being realized in the
university as we know it makes it all the more attractive. But we must
still ask if Milbank’s account of theology is true to the character of
the church’s understanding of the theological task. I wonder, for
example, if Newman were alive today would he be saying something
like Milbank? In order to answer that question I think it worth our
while to look at Newman’s understanding of theology and the role of
theology in the university.
Newman’s The Idea of a University has often been used as a
defense of the “liberal arts college.” No doubt Newman’s insistence
that the university is primarily about teaching not about creating new
knowledge, though he was not against the pursuit of such knowledge
elsewhere, is one of the reasons his book has been so appealing to
those committed to passing on to future generations the “great
texts.”28 I certainly do not mean to call into question many that have
used Newman to defend “the tradition,” but I think such readings can
fail to do justice to the subtle account Newman gives of knowledge
and, in particular, the knowledge of theology.
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For example, the claim with which Newman begins The Idea of
a University, that is, that the university is “a place of teaching
universal knowledge,” is often interpreted in the modernist mode that
makes Newman an advocate of knowledge as an end in itself.29 It is
certainly true that Newman argued that “liberal knowledge” is that
which “stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel,
expects no complement, refuses to be informed (as it is called) by any
end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our
contemplation.”30 I do not think, however, that Newman is
commending art for art’s sake or knowledge as an end in itself; for the
crucial word is “contemplation,” and Newman, being the good
Augustinian that he was, knows that only God can be so
contemplated.31
Levin-like appeals to Newman in support of the liberal notion
that the knowledges that constitute the university have no “use” fail
to ask what Newman means by “universal knowledge.” By
“universal” Newman did not mean that the knowledges that
constitute liberal learning cannot be justified by their utility, but
rather that all knowledge was interconnected because the “universe in
its length and breadth is so intimately knit together.”32 To be educated
is not to be well read or to know a great deal about this or that subject.
Rather, it is the 
only true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many
things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true
place in the universal system, or understanding their respective
values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form
of Universal Knowledge set up in the individual intellect, and
constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the
mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of
Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the
associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every
thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the
image of the whole to every separate portion, till that whole becomes
in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating
its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning.33
Philosophy, not theology, Newman believes to be the discipline
that is distinct from all the sciences, that is, “in some sense”
philosophy is “a science of sciences.” Newman assumes that the
university will be constituted by many subjects and no one person
will be capable of pursuing them all.34 A division of labor is
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necessary to insure the perfection of every art. Newman, for example,
thinks attention should be given in the university to how wealth is
produced. Therefore the study of Political Economy is to be
expected.35 But philosophy is that “habit of mind” in which “the
comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use
of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and
due appreciation of them all” is undertaken. Gerard Loughlin notes
that for Newman, philosophy “is not so much a body of knowledge
distinct from the other sciences, as the cast of mind by which those
sciences are apprehended and thus united. It is ‘an intellectual …
grasp of many things brought together in one.’ It is not the unity of a
general theory of everything, but of a community. Indeed, it is the
university as such, in its universal scope and idea.”36
The significance of philosophy for Newman is nowhere more
evident than in his claim that “university teaching without theology
is simply unphilosophical.” Newman argues that theology, that
science of God by which “the truths we know about God are put into
a system, has a least as good a right to claim a place there as
Astronomy.”37 Note he does not make a theological argument for the
inclusion of theology in the university, but rather argues that given
that the object of knowledge is truth, then theology – which is a
knowledge – cannot be excluded from the university. Accordingly,
if the various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of
teaching in a University, so hang together, that none can be neglected
without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if Theology be a
branch of knowledge, of wide reception, of philosophical structure,
of unutterable importance, and of supreme influence, to what
conclusions are we brought from these two premises but this? that to
withdraw Theology from the public schools is to impair the
completeness and to invalidate the truthworthiness of all that is
actually taught in them.38
The other sciences, therefore, need theology. In order to have
possession of the truth of the various sciences, we must have the
“whole truth.” Theology is not just another subject, but it is the
condition of general knowledge.39 Such truth includes the “revealed
truths” which enter into the provinces of science, philosophy, and
literature. Every science is not equally affected by the omission of
theology. Pure mathematics will not suffer at all, chemistry will feel
the difference less than politics, politics less than history, ethics, or
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metaphysics. But just to the extent the various subjects are connected
with each other, the exclusion of theology will have a deleterious
effect. Newman observes, for example, that “under the shadow of the
church” philosophy does service to the cause of morality, but “when
it is strong enough to have a will of its own” then it is tempted to form
system of ethics in a manner that serves the evils it should oppose.40
Moreover theology also needs the other sciences,41 thus the title
of Discourse IV of The Idea of a University, the “Bearing of Other
Branches of Knowledge on Theology.” For Newman the Catholic
faith is true which means the church has no stake in trying to make
every subject matter “Christian.” For a university, even secular
universities that may not have theology represented, cannot exist
external to the Catholic pale as long as the quest to discover the truth
in the connections is not lost.42 Truth is truth. The Christian accepts
truth where he or she finds it without feeling the need to claim
possession of that truth.43 After all, the Christian believes that “all
that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent,
be it great or small, be it perfect of fragmentary, natural as well as
supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him.”44
That the church feels no necessity to dominate the various
sciences and literatures in the university does not mean that criticism
cannot be made of science and literature. But such criticism is not
about the work of science itself, but about theories and attitudes the
scientist may have assumed that are not constitutive of the science.
The problem is usually that a science tries to explain more than its
method will allow. For example, if it is asserted that we are but
products of an endless series of physical causes and effects, we have
an indication something has seriously gone wrong with the science
that makes such claims.45
The university, therefore, has a constitution and independence in
relation to the church; but practically speaking the university cannot
fulfill its task to teach “universal knowledge” without the church’s
assistance. The university cannot maintain its integrity without the
church. For the university, like all creation, needs the gift that is
superadded to its nature without which nature is incomplete.46 Or as
Newman puts it in The Idea of a University, the university has the
office of intellectual education which is a good not requiring the
church, but the church is necessary to steady the university in the
performance of that office.47
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I cannot pretend that I have done justice to Newman’s subtle and
complex account of the university and, in particular, the role of theology
in the university; for I think Newman provides a quite helpful set of
suggestions for how Christians can have a constructive role vis-à-vis the
universities in which we find ourselves. I suspect that Newman, like
John Milbank, would find the arrogance and insularity of many of the
disciplines that comprise the university theologically problematic. But
Newman, rightly I think, does not ask the various disciplines to submit
to theology. Rather Newman helps us see that our theological task is to
help the various disciplines of the university explore their limits,
possibilities, and connections to other subjects. I do not think Newman
thinks that such an enterprise will result in a unified account of all that
is. The results will always be subject to further questions. The task of
theology is quite rightly to force the questions to be asked.
Of course the last sentence Newman would not have written. He
argues it is the philosopher’s role to raise if not to force questions
concerning limits, possibilities, and connections between disciplines
be asked. I have no reason to disagree with Newman about the role of
philosophy. My hesitancy is that quite simply few philosophers now
understand their task as Newman understood their task. The
“professionalization” of philosophy is now a reality. Philosophers
have become “experts.” It, therefore, seems that the primary role of
theologians vis-à-vis the universities is to ask that philosophers do the
job they were set aside to do.
5. A Concluding Unsatisfying Postscript
Is that all there is? Surely you must think that there has to be a bigger
pay-off than the conclusion that theology needs philosophy if we are
to find our way back into the university. I certainly think more can
and needs to be said, but I do not think the significance of Newman’s
case for the importance of philosophy should be underestimated. Of
course far more important than philosophy regaining its role in the
university is the role itself, namely, that we must somehow recover in
the university what Newman called the “teaching of universal
knowledge.” Yet in the university as we know it no persons,
disciplines, or place exists charged with the responsibility to try to
make what connections may and may not be able to be made.
Connections are often made informally, but that is usually a happy
accident that is not assumed to set a precedent.  
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In the light of the inability to make the kind of connections
Newman thought the heart of the university, some think theology
should assume that task. If theology would undertake the project of
“pulling it all together,” perhaps theology might be recognized as a
legitimate knowledge of the university. I think, however, that would
be a very unfortunate strategy. I do think theologians often exhibit a
gregarious intellectual agenda that should commend their presence in
the university. That theologians read more widely than many of our
colleagues in other discipline is because we are in the happy position,
as the bottom feeders in the university, of having to know what others
are thinking though they do not have to know what we are thinking.
That theologians find themselves in the position of Hegel’s slave I
take to be a very good thing.
I think, however, there is another more important reason that
theology is committed to “making the connections.” The knowledge
that theology names is knowledge of God. Of course theologians
soon discover that such a knowledge is primarily negative, that is,
theology is the ongoing discipline to teach us that most of what we
have to say about God is that we do not know how to talk about God.
But even to know what we cannot say means the theologian cannot
divorce what is known and not known about God from all that we
know. Indeed that is why I think Newman is right to suggest that
theology not only potentially has something to say to other
disciplines; but just as important, theology in order to be theology has
to learn from other disciplines.48
To be sure, therefore, theology certainly is a “field” in which
nothing that is known is irrelevant for the work theology must do.
Yet, as I suggested above, I do not think that means theology should
try to establish its importance for the university by promising to be
the subject that shows where everything “fits.” Such an ambition
would be foolhardy because we do not live in a time when it is
obvious that all that we know in fact “fits.” At best theologians, with
the aid of the philosophers, need to help us understand why what we
know is so often a jumble.
There is another reason, peculiar to my own theological
convictions, that makes it unwise for theology to pretend to be the
discipline that brings order to the disorder of the knowledges of the
university. A project to try to pull it all together I fear could be a
nostalgic attempt to reclaim the habits of Christendom. Christendom
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created the Christian university that made it seem natural that
theology would be the supreme science just as the church was the
supreme institution. I, of course, do think the church is that
community that rightly commands our loyalty in a manner that
relativizes all other loyalties. But the church does so because she can
only rule as a servant. Accordingly theology is only a “queen” of the
sciences if humility determines her work.
That is why I think the situation we confront concerning the role
of theology in the curricula of universities is in many ways quite
favorable to the task to which we are called as theologians. It is a
good thing that theology bears the burden of proof before the
epistemological conceits of the knowledges represented by the
contemporary university. That challenge should not only make us
more truthful and faithful theologians, but we might also discover
different ways to think theologically because we cannot assume the
way theology was once done is the way we must do theology. Of
course theology should never be done to pass muster in the university.
Theology must be done in a manner that glorifies God and serves
God’s people. It has always been my conviction that when theology
is so done, those in the university will take notice because what we
have to say is so interesting.
Moreover, as I suggested at the beginning of this paper, I think
we may well discover that theology cannot be relegated to the
theology or religious studies department. I appreciate Newman’s
contention that the secular sciences should be allowed to be secular.
But I think if Christians learn to take intellectually seriously the
practices that should and do constitute the church, they may well find
that how we think about economics, biology, or physics is different
than how those subjects are now structured in the university. I think
that is particularly true given the intellectual paradigms that dominate
fields like economics and political science.49 The problem, of course,
is not the university or the subjects that constitute the university. The
problem is with those like myself who identify ourselves as
Christians. Namely the challenge is whether any of us live lives as
Christians that are sufficient to force us to think differently about
what is and is not done in the university.
I am convinced, however, that theology’s becoming a subject in
the modern university will not happen if Christians only take a
negative view of the current university. I obviously think that the
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university as we know it is in deep trouble, but that does not mean we
would be better off without the university. We need to remember that
there is no the university, which means that every university will
present a different challenge for the teaching of theology. In order
that theology be recognized as a legitimate endeavor that every
university should desire to have represented in the curriculum,
theologians must do the work of theology without fear. For theology
to be recognized as significant, theologians must have something of
significance to say.
It is, moreover, hard to imagine that theologians do not have
something interesting to say given the subject of our work. It is hard
to make God boring or have little significance for the way we live and
think. The challenge before us, therefore, is not really whether we can
convince our colleagues in the rest of the university that theology
matters. The challenge is whether we are capable of performing the
work of theology with the joy and confidence the subject of theology
requires.50
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3 I do not think theology is an activity peculiar to Christians. It is quite
clear that many Jewish thinkers are theologians. I am sure Islamic
thinkers often “do” theology. I identify theology with Christianity,
because that is the theology I know. My hunch, however, is that the need
for theology may be different for Jews, Muslims, and Christians. That
is clearly a topic for another day and for someone far more learned than
myself. David Burrell, C.S.C., has done the best work so far on this
subject. See his Freedom and Creation (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame, 1993). 
4 I will not be able to give the page numbers of quotes from Levin’s
speech because they were cut off by the photocopier. The address,
however, covered only three pages in the Yale Magazine.
5 Levin seems quite unaware that what the Yale Report of 1827 meant by
“quality of mind” was quite different than what it meant by the turn of
Knowledges of the University 27
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
the century. In his The Emergence of the American University (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), Laurence Veysey notes that people
like Noah Porter of Yale thought the task of the university was to
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foundation of morals, as morals the foundation of religion.” (p. 203) 
14 Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, pp. 213f.
15 Not to be missed, however, is the “success” of a university did not
necessarily mean that the students in the universities shared the same
commitments as their teachers. Veysey notes that few undergraduates
desired to identify themselves with the work of the institution in any
lasting sense. Undergraduates resembled a conscript army rather than a
dedicated core of professionals. Veysey extends this metaphor by
observing “from one point of view the university existed primarily to
keep students in temporary custody amid surroundings which their
parents approved.” (Emergence, p. 269) Veysey claims that few students
took up learning for the sake of learning which also helps account for
the “spectacular” rise of athletics, and in particular football, as an (if not
the most) important aspect of college life for undergraduates. 
Knowledges of the University 29
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
16 Veysey, Emergence, pp. 302-311. That Veysey does not mention
“provosts” only indicates he wrote in 1965.
17 Veysey, Emergence, p. 311.
18 Ibid.
19 I have served eight years (to be sure at different times) on the Duke
University Appointment, Promotion, and Tenure Committee. This is an
advisory committee to the Provost dealing with internal promotions to
tenure as well as external appointments. It is surely an indication of the
diverse character of the knowledges that constitute the contemporary
university that those on the committee are not to judge “fields,” but only
the person’s standing in their field. The “fields,” moreover, become
increasingly specialized in order to be able to claim that the person up
for promotion or for external appointment is “the best in their field.” It
is quite common for chairmen of fields to come before the committee
indicating they know quite little about a member of their department
field.
20 Alasdair MacIntyre’s work stands as the most decisive critique of
Levin’s assumption that reason qua reason is not only possible but
necessarily liberating. Indeed, one of the important developments is the
increasing recognition that the sciences are inadequately understood
when they are divorced from their temporal and spacial contexts. For
example, David Livingston has recently argued that there was a distinct
regional pattern to the rise of scientific Europe which means it is
appropriate to use geographical adjectives such as “English science,”
“French science,” and “Russian science” (Putting Science in Its Place:
Geographies of Scientific Knowledge [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003], p. 15). Livingston does not deny that the modern invention
of the laboratory was an attempt to create a “placeless” science, but he
argues that even laboratory knowledge turns out to be local: thus the
difficulty in reproducing results from different laboratories. Livingston
argues that there is good reason for suspecting that the term “science”
is an “imaginary unity masking the disparate kinds of activity that trade
under that label.” In his An Examined Faith: The Grace of Self-Doubt
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), James Gustafson provides a lovely
account of the dissonance created by the diverse sciences and subjects
an undergraduate might study and how that dissonance makes it
difficult for such a student to maintain any strong theological
convictions. Gustafson observes it is unfortunate that “undergraduate
curricula seldom, if ever, provide an academic milieu in which students
can deliberate about the dissonance even within the human sciences and
humanities, not to mention theology, and weigh the alternatives to
which they are exposed” (p. 32).  
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21 Whether an account of the diverse forms of reasoning in the diverse
subjects of the university is possible is not clear to me. By serving on
the APT committee I have learned that different disciplines use
particular words to describe good work done in that discipline. For
example, in physics the best work is described as “elegant,” which
seems to mean the implications of the work may not be understood or
the work itself may not be understood, but the mathematics has an
undeniable beauty. Work in mathematics is sometimes described as
elegant, but mathematicians usually describe the best work as “deep.”
Deep mathematics usually indicates math not well understood in the
community of mathematics. Once what was “deep” is generally
understood, it becomes applied mathematics. Work in biology is usually
described as “interesting,” which means the work helps me understand
or “see” what I had not understood. The primary words used in the
social sciences are “robust,” “powerful,” “important,” and “useful.”
“Robust” usually means work that helps the social scientist explain
wider implications other than the ones the work was initially designed
to accomplish. In the humanities the work is described as “influential”
which seems to indicate that the work has changed the minds of other
scholars who know something about that subject. In some fields in the
humanities, such as philosophy, the work can be described as
representing a “powerful” argument. I often reflect that the word that
should best describe theology is “faithful” which may well make
theology closer to mathematics and physics than the social sciences. At
least in mathematics and physics it is still assumed that such work is
committed to truth.  
22 Some may well think “incoherence” an inappropriate description of the
American university. After all, how many institutions in our society are
“coherent”? “Incoherent” could equally be a description about most
churches. By using the description “incoherent,” I mean to do no more
than suggest that no one has the authority or the intellectual resources
to say what the university is for or whom it serves. I assume that one
can and should give several responses to the question what the
university is for, but it is by no means clear how those responses can be
consistent with one another. That is why Veysey’s account of the
development of the modern university is so important. He helps us see
that you do not need to be able to provide a coherent account of the
activity that should characterize what universities are about as long as
the university can be “administered.” For a set of essays that on the
whole assume that universities are beyond any possibility of having a
coherent account of their work see The Postmodern University?:
Contested Visions of Higher Education and Society, edited by Anthony
Smith and Frank Webster (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002).
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In his essay, “The Postmodern University,” Peter Scott observes the
natural starting point to begin to think about the current university is
what characteristics knowledge may have in the world in which we find
ourselves. But he observes that “characteristics” suggest regularity and
that is exactly what knowledge in our time does not possess (p. 36). In
such a world Zygmunt Bauman suggests that the authority that now
characterizes the intellectual is not the Cartesian Cogito, but rather, “I
am talked about, therefore I am” (pp. 21f.).
23 One can cite a burgeoning literature about whether any coherence can
be made for religious studies, but that is a subject for another time.
However, for a particularly honest and revealing article that concerns
how difficult it is to separate teaching “about” a religion without being
an advocate, see Martin Jaffee, “Personal Self-Disclosure, Religious
Studies Pedagogy, and the Skeptical Mission of the Public University,”
Bulletin of the Council of Societies for the Study of Religion 33/2 (April
2004), 29-34. In his dissertation written at the University of Chicago,
Uses of Religion: The Dual Role of College Religion Departments at
Mid-Century (June, 2002), Robert Wilson-Black argues that the mid-
century founders of religion programs were forced to create
departments in the face of an inherent tension if not contradiction.
“College administrators and many faculty and alumni leaders wanted
religion courses to include Western moral and civic values. At the same
time it was expected that, in such a department, students should come
to identify religion as a viable academic subject outside of or in addition
to advocacy for one particular religious perspective. The question for
most of these founders eventually became this: How does one, or should
one, extract oneself as a religion professor from the advocacy for a
Christian religious life – which was expected to mediate the crises of
Western civilization and higher education at that time – while
establishing credibility among academic colleagues who looked
askance at such advocacy? Establishing their programs from 1940 to
1951, many founders dealt with these contradictory demands by
attempting to distinguish teaching a religion from other academic
subjects like philosophy, from ‘the church,’ from ‘sectarian theology,’
from ‘Christianity,’ or from campus chapel programs. Their rhetoric,
curricular reforms, and arguments for the uses of teaching religion
encouraged a fragmented identity for religion departments, the residue
of which remains to this day” (pp. 9f.).
24 John Milbank, “The Conflict of the Faculties: Theology and the Economy
of the Sciences,” in Faithfulness and Fortitude: In Conversation with the
Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, edited by Mark Thiessen Nation
and Samuel Wells (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), p. 40.
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25 Milbank obviously titled his essay to remind readers of Kant’s famous
essay, The Conflict of the Faculties. Milbank did so because he is, of
course, arguing the exact opposite of Kant’s position. In The Conflict of
the Faculties, Kant distinguished between the higher and lower faculties
noting that law, medicine, and divinity are called the higher faculties
because they exist in the university only because they are useful to
government. The lower faculties are not constituted by teaching that is
adopted by order of a superior, but are determined by free, that is,
autonomous reason. Kant observes that most people are persuaded by
the higher faculties because people want to be led, even duped. But
Kant argues that for governments to place all authority in the higher
faculties would invite anarchy. So government has a stake in the truths
of the higher faculty being subject to the lower faculty in order to assure
that any historical claims have a rational origin. Kant argued that
Christianity is the most adequate form of rational religion, but the lower
faculty must stand in judgment of exegesis. Kant also saw no reason to
assume that the doctrine of the Trinity, “taken literally,” should have any
practical relevance. Kant is, therefore, led to the blunt claim – “it is
superstition to hold that historical belief is a duty and essential to
salvation.” Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties in Religion
and Rational Theology, translated and edited by Allen Wood and
George DiGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
pp. 238-338. The last quote is from p. 285.    
26 Milbank, p. 42. That theology is now done primarily in seminaries is
part of the problem. Theology as the normative discipline of the church
is rightly thought to be important for training people for the ministry,
but theology is not a “professional discipline.” If Milbank is right, and
I think he is, theology must be part of the curriculum of any university
that desires to have the purpose universities profess. 
27 Milbank, pp. 45f.
28 Newman makes the distinction between “discovery” and “teaching” in
the “Preface” to The Idea of a University, edited, with Introduction and
Notes, by Martin Svaglic (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1960), p. XL.
One always hesitates to disagree with Newman, but I think he was
wrong to make this strict distinction between discovery and teaching. I
am well aware that he simply assumed that this was a division of labor
and no doubt sometimes it is, but I think all good teachers discover that
teaching requires discovery. Aquinas certainly stands as an
exemplification of why discovery and teaching cannot be separated.  
29 I think the title, The Idea of a University, also often misleads people.
They assume that “idea” means “ideal” or “essence,” but as Ian Ker
makes clear, Newman meant by idea that which grows gradually
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making possible our ability to see the connection between diverse
aspects of a reality. Ian Ker, John Henry Newman: A Biography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 302f. Newman, therefore,
did not think The Idea of a University was recommending an idea that
did not exist but he wished might exist. It is extremely important that
the idea in The Idea of a University not be ignored. Newman knew the
university had a history. That is why it is important to read Newman’s
Rise and Progress of Universities and Benedictine Essays (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame, 2001) as a complementary text to The Idea
of a University. The university exists for Newman even when there is
no institution that bears that name. For example, he observes that in all
times there have been universities and they have flourished because of
the desire for learning and the need for teachers. If there has been a
demand there has been a supply (Rise and Progress of Universities, p.
51). Though universities have often enjoyed the patronage of the rich,
the teacher is strong just to the extent what he teaches has intrinsic value
and attraction (pp. 164f.). For Newman the university is certainly an
idea, but unless real people exist who teach and learn the idea is
unfortunately just an “ideal.” Moreover, a site must exist for the
university to exist (p. 24). Which means Newman understood that the
“idea” of the university would take quite different forms at different
times and places.
30 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 81.
31 L. Gregory Jones criticizes Newman for commending “knowledge for
knowledge’s sake,” then observes that such a view of knowledge is
defensible only when such a view is situated with the more
comprehensive end constituted by our worship of God (in an
unpublished paper, “Do Universities Still Care about Ideas?: Newman’s
Proposal and its Implications for Christian Higher Education”). I am
suggesting, and I think Jones is in agreement, that is exactly what
Newman does. The problem occurs when some of Newman’s bald
statements are abstracted from his theological frame. Jones observes
that Newman did not reject teaching courses on professional education,
but Newman only thinks such education is not the primary purpose of
the university. However, Newman believes such an education is better
taught in the university. Even though I think Newman’s view of
knowledge for its own end can be defended, I think Newman was wrong
to separate knowledge and virtue. He argues that philosophy, no matter
how enlightened, gives no command over the passions, but surely that
is to accept the view that philosophy is no more than a subject, the most
important subject to be sure, in the curriculum. That said, however, I
think Newman is right to say that “liberal education makes not the
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Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman.” See Idea of a
University, p. 91. In his eloquent reexamination of Newman’s The Idea
of the University, Jaroslav Pelikan argues that the principle of
knowledge as its own end “must be integrated with a larger and more
comprehensive set of first principles, which can be summarized under
the heading (likewise Aristotelian) of ‘the intellectual virtues’” (The
Idea of the University: A Reexamination [New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992], p. 43). Pelikan rightly calls attention to Aristotle, which
means, however, the intellectual virtues cannot be separated from the
moral virtues. Ian Ker’s paper at the University of Prince Edward Island
conference (October 1-3, 2004), “Faith, Freedom, and the Academy:
The Idea of the University in the 21st Century,” quite persuasively
argued that what Newman meant by a “gentleman” had little to do with
class but rather Newman thought a gentleman is one with a well
educated mind. Ker also maintained that Newman thought such a
person would or should be a Christian.   
32 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 38.
33 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 103. In his John Henry Newman: A
Biography, particularly chapters nine and ten, Ian Ker stresses the
importance of understanding what Newman meant by universal as the
apprehension of the interconnectedness of the “whole.”
34 Those that assume that Newman was a defender of a core curriculum
constituted by the “liberal arts” often do not notice that he insisted that
“Irish studies” be part of the disciplines taught in the Catholic
University of Ireland. In her “Introduction” to Newman’s Rise and
Progress of Universities and Benedictine Essays (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame, 2001), Katherine Tillman tells us that
Newman “regularly attended” the lectures of Eugene O’Curry who held
the Chair of Irish History and Archaeology (p. LXXIII). That Newman
attended O’Curry’s lectures is not surprising because Newman thought
that in the sixth and seventh centuries Ireland saved Christianity. He
observes “the Irish, whose brilliancy of genius has sometimes been
considered, like the Greek, to augur fickleness and change, have
managed to persevere to this day in the science of the saints, long after
their ancient rivals have lost the gift of faith.” 
35 Newman says, “Political economy is the science, I suppose of wealth –
a science simply lawful and useful, for it is no sin to make money, any
more than it is a sin to seek honour; a science at the same time
dangerous and leading to the occasions of sin, as is the pursuit of honour
too; and in consequence, if studied by itself, and apart from the control
of Revealed Truth, sure to conduct a speculator to unchristian
conclusions.” (Idea of a University, pp. 64f.) Later Newman observes
Knowledges of the University 35
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
that every art is improved by confining the professor of it to a single
study, but though the art is advanced by such a concentration, the
individual who pursues the discipline “goes back.” According to
Newman the advantage to the community is in inverse ratio to the
person who commits himself to such a concentrated study (pp. 127f.).
36 Gerard Loughlin, “The University Without Question: John Henry
Newman and Jacques Derrida on Faith in the University” (Unpublished
Paper), pp. 18f. The internal quotes come from The Idea of a University,
1852, Discourse V, pp. 423, 421, 428. Loughlin’s reflections on Newman
and Derrida were motivated by the closure of the Department of
Religious Studies at the University of Newcastle. The Department of
Philosophy had been closed some years earlier, occasioning Loughlin’s
question to the Vice-Chancellor whether you can have a university
without a Department of Philosophy. Loughlin reports the Vice-
Chancellor replied that you could have a university without a
Department of Religious Studies and the Vice-Chancellor has made the
theoretical possibility reality. It would be quite instructive to compare
Newman’s understanding of the role of philosophy with Alasdair
MacIntyre’s account in his essay, “Aquinas’s Critique of Education:
Against His Own Age, Against Ours,” in Philosophers on Education:
New Historical Perspectives, edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty.
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 95-108. MacIntyre, like Newman, argues
that there is that of which theology can speak about which philosophy
knows nothing and there are types of questions answers to which can
only be given by philosophy. But there is also a range of questions about
human nature and the ends of life philosophy and theology share.
MacIntyre accordingly argues that theology cannot do its work well in
what they have to say about human affairs, divine providence, divine
law, and redemption and grace without the work of philosophy. So
theologians have to become philosophers if they are to speak intelligibly
about human powers, reasoning, will and choice and the relationship of
human beings to their ultimate good (pp. 98f.). I have criticized
MacIntyre for sometimes maintaining a far too rigid distinction between
theology and philosophy, but I think he is exactly right about the
theologians’ need to do philosophy. In his paper on  In his paper on
Newman’s Idea at the University of Prince Edward Island conference,
Ian Ker helpfully reminded us that by “philosophy” Newman meant that
habit of mind characterized by equitableness, moderation, and wisdom
rather than philosophy as a department in the university
37 Newman, Idea of a University, pp. 31f. 
38 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 52. It may be objected that Newman’s
reference to “public schools” means what he says is not relevant to the
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university. Newman certainly argued that schools and colleges should
rightly be concerned with “moral formation” in a manner that
distinguished them from the university, but I do not think he is arguing
that theology is only relevant to schools and colleges and not the
universities. Newman also thinks the “theology” he thinks necessary is
natural theology, but he also says on the same page from which the
quotation is taken that he has done so only to carry with him those who
are not Catholic. He, moreover, suggests that much more must be about
“revealed facts and principles” for theology to do its proper work. 
39 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 52. Newman claims that by
“theology” he means “natural theology” because he wants to “carry
along” those who are not Catholics. He observes, however, “that no one
can really set himself to master and to teach the doctrine of an
intelligent Creator in its fullness, without going on a great deal farther
than he at present dreams” (p. 52). Newman seems, therefore, to
maintain that natural theology requires the truths of revelation which
“furnishes facts to the other sciences, which those sciences, left to
themselves, would never reach; and it invalidates apparent facts, which,
left to themselves, they would imagine” (p. 54). Newman does not
argue that theology can be part of the curriculum only as natural
theology, but he rightly assumes “revealed theology” must be part of the
curriculum (p. 54). By “fact” I do not think Newman meant that “facts”
come uninterpreted, but rather are that which we only know by someone
showing us the importance of this or that. 
40 Newman, Idea of a University, pp. 155f.
41 Laughlin, I think, rightly characterizes Newman’s views by noting that
“the labour of knowledge is divided among the sciences, and when
‘certain sciences are away’ we have a ‘defective apprehension’ of the
truth. All sciences are needed for the seeking of truth, in the university
where it is sought. Thus Newman offers us a view of a unified
existence, of creation in relation to creator, which must be studied by us
– as particular, limited creatures – through a myriad of inter-related
sciences: a truly interdisciplinary labor for the truth. And this common
labour includes the co-dependence of theology on other disciplines,
through which it learns of its own proper divine subject through their
learning of the world which the creator has made and makes to be. On
Newman’s account, theology does not appear as the ‘queen of the
sciences’, but as the first amongst equals, for the truth which is to be
known in theology is the fundamental condition of all knowledge” (pp.
18f.). Newman notes the Church “fears no knowledge, but she purifies
all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole” (p.
178).
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42 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 163. 
43 Newman observes “that the Church’s true policy is not to aim at the
exclusion of Literature from Secular Schools, but at her own admission
into them. Let her do for Literature in one way what she does for
Science in Another; each has its imperfection, and she has her remedy
for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no
element of our nature, but cultivates the whole” (Idea of a University,
p. 178).
44 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 50.
45 Newman, Idea of a University, p. 44.
46 Newman, Rise and Progress of Universities, pp. 180-183. 
47 Newman, Idea of a University, p. XXXVII.
48 I am, therefore, sympathetic to Gustafson’s argument in An Examined
Faith: The Grace of Self-Doubt that theology cannot and should not
avoid the challenge presented by the knowledges of the university.
Gustafson, however, thinks such challenges are more easily located than
I believe possible. Gustafson is surely right that any effort to integrate
science and theology is futile, but Gustafson seems to think the results
of science will always be a challenge to the theologian. I do not assume
that some scientific results may be a challenge, but it is the
metaphysical presumptions that inform a science that are more likely to
be the source of conflict. For example, if physics were thought to show
that mechanistic causation “explains” all change, then I think there is a
real conflict between theology and physics. Kenneth Miller, for
example, quite rightly observes the “chance” that is assumed to be at the
heart of a Darwinian account of the world is “not only consistent with
the idea of God, it is the only way in which a truly independent physical
reality can exist” Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for
Common Ground Between God and Evolution (New York: Harper,
1999), pp. 234f. Miller has the good sense, as a scientist, not to make
God part of the metaphysical furniture of the universe. He, therefore,
quite rightly argues that “evolution is not rigged” and that his faith in
God does not “require one to postulate a God who fixes the game” (p.
238).
49 I am, of course, thinking about the dominance of rational choice
methods not only in economics but most of the social sciences. I am not
suggesting that there is nothing to be learned from rational choice, but
the “method” clearly seems to reproduce the liberal assumptions about
human cooperation that should be challenged. 
50 Equally crucial is whether a people exist that demand the work of
theology be done. I have focused this paper on the university, but as
38 Consensus
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/3
important as the university is whether there is an educated public (or
church) that not only wants the work of the university to be done, but
needs such work. One of the deepest problems confronting the modern
university is the loss of such a public. I think few have seen this more
clearly than Alasdair MacIntyre who observes, “there is no type of
institutional arena in our society in which plain persons – not academic
philosophers or academic political theorists – are able to engage
together in systematic reasoned debate designed to arrive at a rationally
well-founded mind on these matters, a common mind which might then
be given political expression. Indeed the dominant forms of
organization of contemporary social life militate against the coming
into existence of this type of institutional arena. And so do the dominant
modes of what passes for political discourse. We do not have the kinds
of reading public necessary to sustain practically effective social
thought. What we have instead in contemporary society are a set of
small-scale academic publics within each of which rational discourse is
carried on, but whose discourse is of such a kind as to have no practical
effect on the conduct of social life” (“Some Enlightenment Projects
Reconsidered,” in Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in
Philosophy, edited by Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley [London:
Routledge, 1999], p. 257). MacIntyre has developed an exemplification
of what a learned public might look like in his “The Idea of an Educated
Public,” in Education and Values: The Richard Peters Lectures, edited
by Graham Hudson (London: University of London Institute of
Education, 1987). 
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